

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
927TH AIR REFUELING WING**

**927th AIR REFUELING WING INSTRUCTION
31-210**

7 August 1999

Security



AIR FORCE ANTITERRORISM (AT) PROGRAM

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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Pages: 9
Distribution: F

This written instruction implements AFPD 31-2 Security and AFI 31-210 AFRC Sup, Air Force Antiterrorism Program, provides information and guidance in an effort to deter and respond to hostile terrorist acts against the resources of the United States Air Force. It establishes responsibilities for the collection and dissemination of timely threat information, and integrates security precautions and defensive measures. This instruction is Unclassified and applies to all 927 Air Refueling Wing personnel here at Selfridge ANGB, Michigan, only. This instruction will be revised annually by the 927 ARW/SFS Information Security Program Manager or when warranted by a change to a new governing security publication. Any requests for changes will be directed through the OPR.

Chapter 1

GENERAL

1.1. Introduction:

1.1.1. Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

1.1.2. Terrorism can occur in peacetime or at anytime throughout the spectrum of conflict.

1.1.3. The immediate objective of terrorists is to generate fear among the populace, disrupt government, induce a general loss of confidence in the existing social order or governmental policies, and to provoke the legal authority to adopt repressive policies.

1.2. Policy:

1.2.1. The United States government will make no concessions to terrorists; it will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. It will use all political, economic, diplomatic, and military resources available to respond to acts of terrorism directed at United States interests.

1.2.2. Air Force policy is to protect, to the best of its ability, Air Force personnel, their dependents, facilities, and equipment from acts of terrorism.

1.3. Responsibilities:

1.3.1. Military or civilian members who see any type of suspicious behavior, or who know or suspect that one of the following acts may occur, will notify local or security forces immediately.

1.3.1.1. Any plot or act to harm or destroy Defense property by sabotage.

1.3.1.2. Any terrorist plan or act to harass or harm Air Force personnel.

1.3.1.3. Any attempt to encourage Air Force personnel to commit desertion, sedition, or violence.

1.3.1.4. Any contact with a known or suspected terrorist or terrorist organization.

1.3.1.5. Any act or statement by an Air Force member, or civilian employee, clearly indicating disloyalty to the United States.

1.3.2. Individuals should be prepared to provide Law Enforcement personnel with the most accurate description of the incident as possible, including:

1.3.2.1. Location.

1.3.2.2. Make, color, size of vehicle.

1.3.2.3. License plate.

1.3.2.4. Height, weight, color of hair, clothing, etc., of any individual.

Chapter 2

TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS (THREATCONS)

2.1. THREATCONS:

2.1.1. Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS) provide for the protection of personnel and resources during real or suspected terrorist or similar high-risk situations.

2.1.2. The Air Force Operations Support Center or MAJCOM Command Post will electronically transmit a THREATCON Alerting Message (TCAM) using a military precedence of Immediate or Flash, to the 927 ARW Command Post. All branches of the Department of Defense use the same THREATCON definitions, although the responses to each THREATCON level may vary slightly between services.

2.1.3. A MAJCOM or USAF abbreviation before the phrase "TCAM" will be used to distinguish originating authority. For example, USAFR TCAM; ACC TCAM; USAF TCAM.

2.1.4. As a rule, TCAMs do not trigger a theater-wide or Air Force-wide THREATCON; they give a summary of the situation and offer a recommended course of action. They do not mandate across-the-board action. The 927 ARW CC will tailor his response to the local situation.

2.1.5. When a TCAM directs a THREATCON action it must be implemented.

2.1.6. A THREATCON implemented in response to a TCAM remains in effect until the originating or higher level authority cancels it.

2.1.7. Five THREATCONS exist, they progress from "Normal" to "Delta".

2.2. THREATCON Normal:

2.2.1. Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.

2.2.2. Normal, everyday security posture.

2.3. THREATCON Alpha:

2.3.1. Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher THREATCONS resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

2.3.2. Recommended Owner/User Actions:

2.3.2.1. Brief all personnel of the current and higher level threat condition. Emphasize security awareness and post THREATCON ALPHA placards in conspicuous areas.

2.3.2.2. Conduct random entry point ID checks at their facilities.

2.3.2.3. Increase surveillance of high-risk facilities, on-base high-risk personnel offices and critical assets. Ensure facilities are locked at the end of the day.

- 2.3.2.4. Increase owner/user security of all areas and assigned government vehicles, particularly vehicles used by high-risk personnel.
- 2.3.2.5. Implement prohibited parking adjacent to high-risk facilities.
- 2.3.2.6. Review all terrorist threat guidance, to include bomb threats.
- 2.3.2.7. Reduce the number of exterior entrances to high-risk facilities.
- 2.3.2.8. Remove signs and symbols from facilities, storing firearms, explosives, munitions, etc.
- 2.3.2.9. Vary routines and routes to work by high-risk personnel.
- 2.3.2.10. Secure other than high-risk facilities/areas when not in use.
- 2.3.2.11. Monitor deliveries arriving at all on-base facilities

2.4. THREATCON Bravo:

2.4.1. Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.

2.4.2. Recommended Owner/User Actions:

- 2.4.2.1. Continue those THREATCON ALPHA actions previously directed.
- 2.4.2.2. Brief all personnel on the current and higher level threat condition, emphasize security awareness, and post THREATCON BRAVO placards in place of THREATCON ALPHA placards, in conspicuous areas.
- 2.4.2.3. Continue random checks of personnel ID at facility entry points.
- 2.4.2.4. Conduct 100 percent ID checks at entry control points to controlled areas and all high-risk facilities not manned by Security Forces.
- 2.4.2.5. Require owner/user presence in high-risk facilities on a 24-hour basis.
- 2.4.2.6. Keep windows, drapes, and blinds closed around high-risk personnel and facilities.
- 2.4.2.7. Place essential personnel and response forces on standby.
- 2.4.2.8. Increase owner/user awareness to challenge and identify all unknown individuals in their work areas.
- 2.4.2.9. Restrict uniform wear off-base.
- 2.4.2.10. Restrict driving off base in government vehicles.

2.5. THREATCON Charlie:

2.5.1. Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received that some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of this measure for more than a short period will probably create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

2.5.2. Recommended Owner/User Actions:

- 2.5.2.1. Continue all THREATCON ALPHA and BRAVO actions previously directed or introduce those not already implemented.

2.5.2.2. Brief all personnel on the current and higher level threat condition, emphasize security awareness and post THREATCON CHARLIE placards in place of THREATCON BRAVO placards, in conspicuous areas.

2.5.2.3. Lock all exterior doors to all facilities and establish/man entry points. Conduct 100 percent ID checks at all facility entry points and Inspect all hand-carried items entering all facilities.

2.5.2.4. Strictly enforce no parking near (25 meters/75 feet) high-risk facilities.

2.5.2.5. Stagger duty/work hours.

2.5.2.6. Temporarily suspend work on base by nonessential civilian employees.

2.6. THREATCON Delta:

2.6.1. Implementation applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely.

2.6.2. Recommended Actions:

2.6.2.1. Continue THREATCON ALPHA, BRAVO and CHARLIE actions or introduce those not already implemented.

2.6.2.2. Brief all personnel on the current threat condition, emphasize security awareness, and post THREATCON DELTA placards in place of THREATCON CHARLIE placards, in conspicuous areas.

2.6.2.3. Augment security forces as necessary.

2.6.2.4. Identify all vehicles already on the installation within operational or mission support areas.

2.6.2.5. Continue to control all facility access points and implement positive identification of all personnel.

2.6.2.6. Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and parking areas.

2.6.2.7. Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.

Chapter 3

BOMB THREATS

3.1. General:

3.1.1. Bombers are not normally random attackers. Terrorists most often select a target according to the potential publicity and political or psychological gain that might be achieved by a bombing. Generally, terrorist bombings are meant to destroy property, not endanger lives. Criminal bombers, other than terrorists, select targets for a variety of reasons: revenge, extortion, and intimidation being the most prominent.

3.1.2. The most common reason for making a bomb threat are:

3.1.2.1. The caller simply wants to disrupt normal activities.

3.1.2.2. The caller has definite knowledge of a bomb and wishes to minimize the risk of injury to others.

3.2. Receiving a Threat:

3.2.1. Statistics show that the majority of bomb threats are made over the telephone. All personnel who handle incoming calls will be supplied with a bomb threat checklist (AF Form 440).

3.2.2. When a bomb threat is received, the individual receiving the threat will hold up the bomb threat card; this allows the call to be monitored by more than one person, and enables another individual to notify management and security.

3.2.3. The individual handling the call will remain calm and concentrate on the exact wording of the message and any other details needed to evaluate the threat. Vital blocks of the AF Form 440 that must be filled in include:

3.2.3.1. When is the bomb going to explode?

3.2.3.2. Where is the bomb located?

3.2.3.3. What will cause it to explode?

3.2.3.4. Why was the bomb planted?

3.2.3.5. What is the caller's name?

3.2.3.6. Background sounds.

3.2.4. Although, written threats comprise a smaller percentage of bomb threats, they will be evaluated as fully as one received over the telephone.

3.2.5. Written threats often provide excellent document-type evidence. Once a written threat is recognized, further handling will be avoided to preserve fingerprints, handwriting, postmarks, and other markings for examination. Each page of a threat will be placed in a separate protective cover, such as a large envelope; additional and needless handling will be avoided.

3.3. Evacuation:

3.3.1. After evaluating the credibility of the threat, the Commander, upon recommendation from the Security Forces, will decide whether to:

- 3.3.1.1. Take no action.
- 3.3.1.2. Search without evacuation.
- 3.3.1.3. Initiate a partial evacuation.
- 3.3.1.4. Conduct a complete evacuation and search.

3.3.2. When a complete evacuation is ordered, primary and alternate evacuation routes will be searched first.

3.3.3. Prior to leaving an office, all desks, lockers, and file cabinets will be unlocked, and all machinery turned off; the lights will be left on. All purses, briefcases, personal packages, and lunch boxes which may cause unnecessary, wasted search efforts will be removed by employees prior to departure.

3.3.4. Each office will designate an individual to open windows and doors to vent and minimize blast and fragmentation damage.

3.3.5. Individuals evacuating the building will remain calm, exit the building in an orderly fashion, and once outside, move as far away from the building as possible.

3.4. Description:

3.4.1. The appearance of an explosive device is up to the imagination of the bomber. Logically, the device must be carried or driven to where it is placed. A bomb may consist of:

- 3.4.1.1. A pipe bomb-steel or PVC pipe section with end caps in just about any configuration; external fusing such as a wick or clock or battery.
- 3.4.1.2. Briefcases, boxes-any style, color, and size, including what appears to be discarded fast-food containers. Some may even be as small as a cigarette package.
- 3.4.1.3. Postal Service mail-especially if the address is incorrect or the return address/postmark is strange, unexpected, or missing. Rigid envelopes can be a clue to explosive contents.

3.5. Package and Letter Bomb Indicators:

- 3.5.1. Postal indicators:
 - 3.5.1.1. Sender unknown.
 - 3.5.1.2. Point of origin.
 - 3.5.1.3. Distorted handwriting.
 - 3.5.1.4. Inaccurate address or type of mail.
 - 3.5.1.5. Unusual endorsements or restrictions.
 - 3.5.1.6. Excessive postage.
 - 3.5.1.7. Foreign mail.
 - 3.5.1.8. Air mail.
 - 3.5.1.9. Special delivery.

3.5.1.10. Resistance when opened.

3.5.2. Envelope or parcel indicators:

3.5.2.1. Excessive weight.

3.5.2.2. Ridgity and bulkiness.

3.5.2.3. Unprofessional packaging.

3.5.2.4. Irregularity.

3.5.2.5. Oil stains.

3.5.2.6. Odor.

3.5.2.7. Protruding wires, strings, etc.

3.5.2.8. Odd noises.

3.5.3. Special Markings:

3.5.3.1. Fragile.

3.5.3.2. Confidential.

3.5.3.3. Private.

3.5.3.4. Handle with care.

3.5.3.5. Personal.

3.5.3.6. Rush.

3.5.3.7. Eyes Only.

3.6. When a Suspicious Item is Found:

3.6.1. Bombs can be placed anywhere. When a suspicious item is found:

3.6.1.1. Isolate the item.

3.6.1.2. Inform the authorities.

3.6.1.3. Do not open.

3.6.1.4. Do not handle more than is necessary.

3.6.1.5. Keep people away.

3.6.1.6. Attempt to verify item with addressee.

3.6.1.7. Open windows and doors.

3.6.1.8. Do not smoke in the vicinity.

3.6.1.9. Note the circumstances of the incident.

3.6.1.10. Ensure first aid capability.

3.6.1.11. Look for other bombs.

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