

439AWI10-201

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER 439th AIRLIFT WING

439th AIRLIFT WING INSTRUCTION 10-201

22 June 2000

Operations

WESTOVER AIR RESERVE BASE (ARB) THREAT WORKING GROUP (TWG)

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This instruction implements AFPD 10-2, *Readiness*. It establishes guidelines for the Threat Working Group (TWG) operating at Westover ARB. It applies to all Westover ARB personnel in support of contingency and non-contingency missions.

## **1. General:**

1.1. Primary Members of the Westover ARB TWG:

1.1.1. Intelligence Office (439 OSS/IN) (Chair).

1.1.2. Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI).

1.1.3. Security Forces Squadron (439<sup>th</sup> SFS).

1.1.4. Support Group: Civil Engineering (CE), Disaster Preparedness (CEX), Fire Department (CEF), and Bio Environmental Engineering (SGPB).

1.1.5. Airlift Wing: Plans (XP) and Command Post (CP).

1.1.6. Operations Assistant (439<sup>th</sup> OSS/OSO).

1.2. Alternate Members of the TWG:

1.2.1. Communications Squadron.

1.2.2. Military Personnel Flight (439<sup>th</sup> MSS/DPM).

1.2.3. Finance Office.

1.2.4. Medical Squadron (439<sup>th</sup> MDS ).

1.2.5. Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron.

1.3. Tenant Organizations of the TWG:

1.3.1. MA Army National Guard.

1.3.2. Marine Corps Site Support Element (MCSSE).

## **2. Procedures.**

2.1. The TWG provides wing, group, and squadron commanders with a single focal point for assessing threats to Westover ARB, its personnel, and personnel deployed in support of contingency and non-contingency missions worldwide.

2.2. Monthly TWG meetings combine operations, intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection agencies with selected functional area representatives to assess risks and recommend countermeasures.

XP will notify IN and AFOSI of upcoming approved contingency deployments to ensure deploying personnel receive the appropriate Intelligence and Force Protection briefings.

2.3. The TWG meets monthly or as requested by any TWG member, the Wing or Operations Group commander (OG/CC).

2.4. OSO monitors current and near-term 337<sup>th</sup> Airlift Squadron mission activity. The DPM and XP will monitor Westover ARB personnel deployment status.

2.5. AFOSI and SFS monitor various base security, threat, counterintelligence and information.

2.6. IN monitors the AMC and AFRC TWG and theater threat products. IN will present findings to Wing and Group commanders/Crisis Action Team, as required. IN will present a Threat Level/THREATCON briefing to the TWG at each meeting.

2.7. MCSSE security officer and/or alternate should attend each meeting.

2.8. Include MCSSE in all phone chain recalls to pass relevant security information (terrorist phone calls, mail bombs).

2.9. Tenants may call meetings on special occasions.

2.10. MCSSE may provide secondary communications for major incidents on the installation.

**Table 1 - STANDARD COUNTERMEASURES (OPR)**

A. Negligible threat location; no specific force protection measure required (AFOSI, 439OG/CC/SFS)
B. Reserved for later use
C. Criminal threat exists – enforce personal protection measures (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS)
C1. Petty theft, street crime; travel in groups, wear civilian clothes off base, & avoid high risk areas (439 AW/CC/OG, AFOSI, IN)
C2. High crime area (muggings, car-jackings, armed robberies); minimize activities after dark (in addition to c1) (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
C3. Extreme violent crime present; stay in hotel or on base (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
D. Manpad threat exist; employ aircraft defensive systems (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
E. Reserved for later use
F. Poor airfield lighting & security; restrict airfield operations to daylight hours only (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
G. Poor security for aircraft & personnel; no remain overnight (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
H. Poor security for aircraft & personnel; minimize ground time (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, OSS/IN)
I. Incomplete assessment, more research required (TWG)
J. Threat on airfield exists; arm crewmembers (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
K. USAFE TWG item: medical advisory-additional immunizations/personal protective

equipment medications and listed in the comments (439 AW/CC/OG/MDS/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
K1. USAFE TWG item: local community food and/or water not safe-drink only sealed water and eat only food served hot (439 AW/CC/OG/MDS/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
K2. USAFE TWG item: upper respiratory disease threat-meningococcal immunizations required, consult immunizations (439 AW/CC/OG/MDS/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
K3. USAFE TWG item: disease carrying insects present-use insect repellent (DEET), wear long sleeve shirts, no shorts (439 AW/CC/OG/MDS/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
L4. USAFE TWG ITEM: malaria threat-anti-malarial medications required, consult flight surgeon (439 AW/CC/OG/MDS/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
M. Hostile foreign intelligence (FIS) threat exists – maintain good OPSEC (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
M1. Medium FIS threat – be aware that Americans have been targeted (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
M2. High FIS threat – expect surveillance & monitoring of phones hotel rooms and taxis (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
M3. Critical FIS threat – expect exploitation by FIS (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
N. Reserved for later use
O. Airfield security is poor – deploy Mission Support Team or coordinate local security for aircraft (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
O1. Assign AFRC Raven team (AFRC/SF, 439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI)
O2. Arrange local security for aircraft (AFRC/SF, 439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI)
P. Terrorism threat exists – maintain low profile (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
P1. Americans are not direct targets – avoid demonstrations, public transportation sites (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
P2. Americans are direct targets – avoid all public areas and high risk establishments when possible (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
P3. Known or suspected targeting of airfield (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, AFOSI, IN)
Q. Unrest and civil disorder exists – maintain low profile (439 AW/CC/OG/SFS, IN)
R. Threat situation presents danger to aircraft personnel – cancel mission (AMC/TACC, AFRC/DOOM/DOOX, 439 AW/CC/OG)
R1. Contact sponsor to restrict MOG (AMC/TACC, AFRC/DOOM/DOOX, 439 AW/CC/OG, OSO)
R2. Contact sponsor to move mission/deployment base (AFRC/DOOM/DOOX, 439 AW/CC/OG)
R3. Contact sponsor to modify mission deployment schedule (AMC/TACC, AFRC/DOOM/DOOX, OSO/SFS/439 AW/CC/OG)
R4. Contact sponsor to enhance airfield security (AMC/TACC/TWG, AFRC/SF/DOOX, OSO/IN/SFS/439 AW/CC/OG)

R5. Contact sponsor to vary arrival and departure times (AMC/TACC, AFRC/DOOM/DOOX, 439 AW/CC/OG)
R6. Contact sponsor to restrict airfield ops to day only (AMC/TACC, AFRC/DOOM/DOOX, 439 AW/CC/OG)
R7. Carry aircrew ensemble (OSO, 439 AW/CC, OG, Logistics Group (LG))
R8. Provide deploying troops personal weapons (439 AW/CC/OG/LG)
R9. Carry ground crew ensemble (439 OSS/OSL (Life Support) and 439 AW/CC/CE/LG)
R10. Provide mission/deployment troops with body armor (OSO, CC, LG)
S. Raise THREATCON at threatened AFRC base (AFRC/DO/SF and 439 AW/CC/OG)
T. Provide the unit a special risk assessment briefing and/or force protection information (AFRC/DOIO/SF/AFOSI-3FIR OL-B).
T1. Brief troops on personal counter-terrorism protective measures (AFOSI)
T2. Brief troops on foreign intelligence threat (AFOSI)

MARTIN M. MAZICK, Colonel, USAFR

Commander

## **Attachment 1**

### **FORCE PROTECTION ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION**

A1.1. Perimeter.

A1.1.1. Fencing/Walls.

A1.1.1.1. Condition of airfield fence or wall (type, height, condition, gaps noted, etc.).

A1.1.1.2. Area of clear zones on each side of the fence/wall.

A1.1.1.3. Clearly marked "No Trespassing" or "No Admittance" signs.

A1.1.2. Other Physical Barriers.

A1.1.2.1. List different types, locations, and numbers of barriers observed.

A1.1.2.2. Monitored by close circuit TV (CCTV).

A1.1.3. Patrols.

A1.1.3.1. Perimeter control.

A1.1.3.2. Frequency and regularity of patrols. (Are patrols conducted on a predictable schedule or are

they conducted randomly by the airfield security force? If not on a regular schedule, is the variance purposeful (i.e., a security measure))?

A1.1.3.3. Is patrol made on foot or vehicles?

A1.1.3.4. How many people are in each patrol?

A1.1.4. Entry Control Points.

A1.1.4.1. Number and location.

A1.1.4.2. Number and location of gates into/out of airfield. Are gates locked if unmanned?

A1.1.4.3. Number of guards at each entry point (military/civilian (airfield security police) (day/night))?

A1.1.5. Watchtowers/Fixed Guard Positions.

A1.1.5.1. Number, location, and description (e.g., ground level guard shack, elevated tower, fixed fighting positions/bunkers, etc.).

A1.1.5.2. Number of guards at each location?

A1.1.6. Entrance Procedures.

A1.1.6.1. If entry is controlled, what personal identification is required for individuals and vehicles?

A1.1.6.2. Are private vehicles allowed?

A1.1.6.3. If so, what method of registration is required?

A1.1.6.4. Are all persons in a vehicle required to show identification?

A1.1.6.5. What are visitor control procedures (i.e., procedures for visitor approval and identification)?

A1.1.6.6. What are visitor escort procedures?

A1.1.6.7. To what degree are vehicles, personnel and their possessions searched?

A1.1.6.8. Do any of the above procedures vary at night (i.e., all personnel must show identification at night when entering the installation, etc.)?

A1.1.7. Lighting.

A1.1.7.1. Is entire boundary lighted at night?

A1.1.7.2. Are additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/entry points?

A1.1.7.3. Are mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?

A1.2. Flight Line/Ramp Security.

A1.2.1. Fencing.

A1.2.1.1. Is the flight line/ramp fenced?

A1.2.1.2. Describe (type, height, condition (any gaps, holes, etc.))?

A1.2.1.3. Are there clear zones on each side of fence?

A1.2.1.4. Is the area posted "No Trespassing" or "No Admittance"?

A1.2.2. Barriers.

A1.2.2.1. List different types, locations, and numbers of barriers observed.

A1.2.2.2. Is the flight/ramp under CCTV?

### A1.2.3. Patrols.

A1.2.3.1. Do armed guards control flight line/ramp?

A1.2.3.2. Frequency and regularity of patrols. (Are patrols conducted on a predictable schedule or are they conducted randomly by security?)

A1.2.3.3. If not on a regular schedule, is the variance purposeful (i.e., a security measure)?

A1.2.3.4. Is patrol made on foot or vehicles?

A1.2.3.5. How many people are in each patrol?

### A1.2.4. Entry Control Points (ECP).

A1.2.4.1. Number, location and description of ECPs at flightline/ramp.

A1.2.4.2. Number of guards at each ECP?

### A1.2.5. Watchtowers/Fixed Guard Positions Around Flight Line/Ramp.

A1.2.5.1. Number, location, and description (e.g., ground level guard shack, elevated tower, fixed fighting positions/bunkers, etc.).

A1.2.5.2. Number of guards at each location?

### A1.2.6. Flight Line/Ramp Entrance Procedures.

A1.2.6.1. If entry is controlled, what form(s) of personal identification are required for individuals and vehicles?

A1.2.6.2. Are private vehicles allowed?

A1.2.6.3. If so, what method of registration is required?

A1.2.6.4. Are all persons in a vehicle required to show identification?

A1.2.6.5. What are visitor control procedures (i.e., procedures for visitor approval and identification)?

A1.2.6.6. What are visitor escort procedures?

A1.2.6.7. To what degree are vehicles, personnel and their possessions searched?

A1.2.6.8. Do any of the above procedures vary at night (i.e., all personnel must show identification at night when entering the installation, etc.)?

### A1.2.7. Lighting.

A1.2.7.1. Is flight line/ramp lighted at night?

A1.2.7.2. Are additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/entry points?

A1.2.7.3. Are mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?

### A1.3. Security Force.

#### A1.3.1. Force Level.

A1.3.1.1. How many guards are typically on duty during the day and night?

A1.3.1.2. DOD Guards or security police?

A1.3.1.3. Contract personnel?

A1.3.1.4. How long can this force operate before being augmented by TDY or garrison (locally stationed) personnel?

A1.3.1.5. Shift duration and shift change procedures/times.

A1.3.1.6. What local customs might result in decreased security (e.g. national holidays, traditional daily rest periods, etc.)?

A1.3.2. Personnel.

A1.3.2.1. Are personnel well trained and professional (does this vary by position; are the supervisory personnel better trained or more motivated)?

A1.3.2.2. What factors make individual members or groups susceptible to blackmail/bribery (e.g. low pay, irregular pay, and mistreatment by senior leadership, etc.)?

A1.3.3. Equipment.

A1.3.3.1. Types of weapons carried by guards.

A1.3.3.2. Additional weapons are available (what weapons can be used, if needed; what weapons are used on vehicles, at entry points, guard towers, etc.?)

A1.3.3.3. What forms of communications gear do the security personnel use?

A1.3.4. Quick Reaction/Counterterrorist Units.

A1.3.4.1. Does such a force exist?

A1.3.4.2. Is it on or near the airfield?

A1.3.4.3. What is its reaction time?

A1.3.4.4. How large a force is it?

A1.3.4.5. To what degree is responsibility delegated in crisis situations?

A1.3.4.6. How is the force trained and equipped?

A1.3.4.7. Does it have higher morale than the regular guard force?

A1.3.4.8. Has it successfully conducted operations in the past?

A1.3.5. Personnel Threat.

A1.3.5.1. Dissidents known to operate in the area of the airfield.

A1.3.5.2. Identify these groups by name with leaders if known.

A1.3.5.3. Dissidents known to possess stand-off weapons surface-to-air missiles, rocket propelled grenade, mortar, etc. (specific type and any known modification).

A1.3.5.4. Are these groups known to possess communications monitoring equipment (identifying type and capability, if known)?

A1.3.5.5. Are these groups known to have anti-U.S. sentiments?

A1.3.5.6. What past incidents have occurred in which targeting of U.S. personnel, equipment, or facilities occurred?

A1.3.5.7. Do hostile elements have any specific times/dates when they are historically active?

A1.3.5.8. Do they have the support of the local populace?

A1.3.6. Physical Location.

A1.3.6.1. What natural/manmade obstacles are in the vicinity of the airfield (e.g., power lines, tall buildings, etc.)?

A1.3.6.2. Identify areas surrounding flight line parking that could be used by hostile elements to covertly view airfield operations and to launch attacks?

A1.3.6.3. How suitable is the surrounding terrain and vegetation for a standoff attack?

A1.3.6.4. Does this vary seasonally?